DCI/IC 75-1794 2 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC

SUBJECT:

HUMINT Branch/Human Sources Committee

Reorganization Recommendations

- 1. I am convinced that the HUMINT Branch/Human Sources Committee problem as it relates to IC Staff reorganization is not clearly understood.
- 2. The Human Sources Committee (I am proposing a name change to Human Resources Information Committee) requires a permanent and enlarged staff to accomplish its tasks. For the past year the HSC has required outside support from IC/HUMINT Branch. This support has been moderately effective, facilitated by the dual roles of General Wilson as D/DCI/IC and Chairman, HSC.
- 3. Regardless of personality and origin, hopefully from State in the form of an Ambassador or ex-Ambassador, the proposed new HSC chairman will have his own persuasions, attitudes and approaches. The DCI and D/DCI/IC have in the past found

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it politically and otherwise expedient to call on an independent staff capability to handle certain HSC matters (Tab A). The DCI and D/DCI/IC will require this independent HUMINT staff capability even more with a full-time HSC chairman and staff.

- 4. IC/HUMINT staff element activities are not comparable to the SIGINT and Imagery staff functions. There is no national HUMINT program manager or responsible individual.

 Most national human sources collection activities are not part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. Many departments capable of contributing to the national effort have no information/intelligence plans, no defined information objectives, no programs, and no defined information (or intelligence) managers and information-management mechanisms.

 These major agencies do not yet recognize the role of the DCI or the IC Staff.
- 5. The human sources effort is more than an intelligence community problem. It is virtually a government-wide matter. Important and continuing initiatives outside USIB member departments are required to achieve a coordinated national effort in human sources information collection and reporting. These initiatives involve departments and agencies such as Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, Interior and Justice, among

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others. A staff capability outside the HSC is necessary to focus this effort with the required impact (see Tab B).

Obscuring the intelligence label to the extent possible is also required in dealing with these departments and agencies.

- 6. I strongly recommend that any reorganization of the IC Staff provide for the following:
 - a. A solid and expanded Human Sources Committee staff, preferably housed in the IC Staff, capable of supporting a full-time chairman also in the IC Staff.
 - b. An independent human sources information and intelligence staff capability directly responsive to the D/DCI/IC and DCI separate from the HSC staff, but operating in tandem with the HSC staff. (There should be duality of functions, e.g., Chief HUMINT Branch serves as vice-chairman HSC and individual IC/HUMINT officers serve as heads of HSC sub-committees.)
 - c. Positioning and identification of the HUMINT Branch (with new title: Human Resources) such that it can perform effectively outside the intelligence community without the stigma attached to intelligence and the relationship between CIA and clandestine activity.
 - d. The IC Staff human sources information (HUMINT) staff should operate directly under the D/DCI/IC or


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his deputy. It should not be subordinated to any intelligence functional staff element which is deeply involved in other major collection disciplines. Such involvement comingles these activities with those of HUMINT in such a way as to over-emphasize, at least in terms of cultural impact upon non-intelligence agencies, the intelligence aspects of what otherwise should be regarded as nonintelligence, non-sensitive information and/or cultural exchange activities. In summary, such subordination within a larger staff element with broad intelligence responsibilities would (1) aggravate security concerns and decrease effectiveness in dealing with DDO and other clandestine components of the intelligence community, and (2) attach intelligence connotations of traditional intelligence programs to initiatives of the IC Staff with non-intelligence agencies of the government.

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Attachments
As stated



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Tab A

Typical HSC Actions performed outside HSC staff:

- Human Sources Committee Action Program CY-75
 drafting and review,
- FOCUS Assessments preparation of staff summaries for Gen. Wilson and Mr. Colby on HSC FOCUS papers,
- 3. FOCUS follow-up letters to and discussions with Ambassadors,
- 4. Preparation of National HUMINT Plan.
- 5. All Clandestine Intelligence Collection Advisory Group matters.
- 6. Direct management follow-up actions at State, DOD and other agencies in support of HSC.

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Typical HUMINT Branch actions not dealing with Human Sources

1. DOD

- a. Revision of interdepartmental agreements -- CIA/DOD.
- b. IC staffing (includes USIB) of DOD Foreign Intelligence Advisory and Assistance Programs, STARK ACE, STARK QUEEN, STARK KING, and others.
- c. Community orientation of departing Chiefs of MAAGs Missions, Mil Groups.

2. CIA

- a. Interdepartmental liaison on foreign clandestine intelligence matters.
- b. Coordination of special clandestine programs with the military clandestine services and DDO.


3. STATE

- a. Human skills and collection management doctrine development and training input to Foreign Service Institute training courses.
- b. Direct liaison with State line components to facilitate field collector interface with community analytical/production elements.
- c. MODE supporting DCI in community HUMINT resource allocation cases in MODE system.
- d. Action follow-up to FOCUS assessments (related to para 3, Tab A) and related coordination matters with State regional bureaus.

4. <u>Treasury</u>

Orientation and collection management training input.

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MEMORANDUM FOR:						_
	,	Mr.	E.	н.	Knoche	

- 1. Our own continuing review of various Agency activities coincides with external inquiries by the President's Commission on CIA activities within the United States and by a new select committee of the Senate tasked to review U.S. intelligence activities.
- 2. All of this provides favorable opportunity for development of alternative plans and policies that can lead to more effective organization and functioning of both the U.S. Intelligence Community and the CIA.
- 3. Please establish a small and temporary task force with the following specific duties:
 - a. Gather together plans and concepts that can be useful to me in considering future organization and functions in CIA and the Intelligence Community. It will be helpful to be able to provide the President's Commission and Congressional bodies with our advice and recommendations in these areas.
 - b. Ensure the best possible quality and consistency of staff support to me in my Community leadership role and as head of the CIA in dealings with the President's Commission and Congressional committees engaged in review of intelligence activities.
 - c. Conduct direct liaison between the Director's office and the staff of the President's Commission.
 - d. Conduct direct liaison between the Director's office and staffs of the Senate or other Congressional review committees in coordination with the Office of Legislative Counsel.

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4. The Intelligence Community Staff will provide support to these activities and keep USIB principals involved and advised as appropriate with respect to responses to the Presidential Commission on CIA Activities within the United States or select Congressional committees reviewing intelligence activities.

Ĕ. Colby

Director

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DIARY - 17 January 1975 (Continued)

1. General Giller called re conversion of AEC to ERDA and AEC. He advised he had talked to Seamans about the role the intelligence function would serve. He stated he had heard that members of the IC Staff had been concerned about the location of the intelligence function. He advised that Seamans wanted the intelligence function to be under the National Security Unit, i.e., Giller, and that the terms of reference for the function would require the division to serve all of ERDA as well as the AEC Commissioners. He noted also that his small staff was sensitive to the Intelligence Community's interest in the peaceful use of atomic energy and that he would represent that interest properly /at the USIB. I stated that one member of our staff had raised the question as to the location of the intelligence function in the reconstituted ERDA but to my knowledge we were all awaiting some determination of the final location. I suggested that at the next meeting of USIB he be prepared to give a briefing on the intelligence role in ERDA, its location, etc. by way of information. He agreed to do so. (Attention Please follow up on this.)

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I alerted the Director to the call and confirmed that he is fairly relaxed about the matter. He agreed the USIB briefing would make sense and will look forward to a subsequest session with Seamans which Giller also advised he would arrange in the course of the upcoming weeks.

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(MPPF1)

John:

The question of ERDA (AEC) membruships on USIB is a dead issue. Mr. Colley indicated that he does not intend to bring up this point at this time. Gor Giller will bruflens discuss at USIB or 201 Jan the new Agency and where intelligence fits in.

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